The SEC National Examination Program announced its 2012 examination priorities. Those priorities are selected by senior staff from the National Exam Program’s offices along with senior SEC staff from the various Divisions and offices. Many of those priorities tie to areas of focus for the Enforcement Division. The priorities are divided into two groups: 1) NEP wide initiatives which cut across the entire program; and 2) Program area specific initiatives which tie to select areas.

NEP Wide Initiatives

Six program wide initiatives were identified as the most specific:

Fraud detection and prevention — an initiative that focuses on employing qualitative and qualitative tools and techniques to identify fraudulent or unethical behavior

Corporate governance, conflicts of interest and enterprise risk management — an initiative that centers on meeting with senior management and boards of registrants to review how the firm handles conflicts of interest and legal, compliance, financial and operational risks

Technology — an initiative that centers on examining questions regarding interconnectedness, the speed used by market participants and regulators and systems related to the markets, access and information security

Dual registrants – is a facet of the program that focuses on issues relating to dual registration by broker-dealers and investment advisers and

New laws and regulations – will focus on general solicitation practices and the verification of accredited investor status under recently adopted Rules; and

Retirement vehicles and rollovers — an initiative that considers advisers who target retirement age workers to roll over plans and how marketing to this group is done by market professionals

Program Area-Specific Initiatives

The initiatives under this area center on the investment adviser/investment company program, the broker-dealer exam program, the market oversight exam program and the clearing and settlement exam program.

Investment Adviser/investment company program

Core risks

Ø Safety of assets and custody — focuses on issues such as the Custody Rule

Ø Conflicts of interest in certain adviser business models — concerns unaddressed conflicts of interest and

Ø Marketing/performance — centers on the accuracy and completeness of claims by advisers regarding their investment objectives and performance

New and emerging issues and initiatives

Ø Never-before examined advisers — an initiative to review those who have not been examined

Ø Wrap fee programs — monitors these programs, recommendations about them and their implementation

Ø Quantitative trading models — examines if advisers with substantial reliance on quantitative portfolio approaches have adopted and implemented necessary compliance policies and procedures

Ø Presence exams — continues an initiative from last year to examine a significant percentage of advisers registered since the effective date of Section 402 of Dodd-Frank

Ø Payments for distribution in guise — examines a variety of payments made by advisers and funds to distributors and intermediaries in relation to the disclosures about these items and supervision and

Ø Fixed income investment companies — monitors the risks and disclosures with a changing interest rate environment

Policy topics

Ø Money market funds — examines funds that exhibit, to some extent, outlier behavior

Ø Alternative investment companies — focuses on funds with alternative investment strategies, considering issues such as staffing, compliance and the suitability of recommendations and

Ø Securities lending arrangements — examines these arrangements and their compliance with excemptive orders and no-action letters

Broker-dealer exam program

Core risks

Ø Sales practices/fraud – focuses on issues such as affinity fraud targeting seniors and others, micro-cap fraud, suitability and unregistered entities or other unusual capital raising activities

Ø Supervision — concerns the supervision by the broker dealer of independent contracts, representatives with significant disciplinary histories and private securities transactions

Ø Trading — concerns with issues such as market access, erroneous order, high speed trading, market leakage, market manipulation, cyber security and similar issues

Ø Internal controls assesses the effectiveness of key control functions

Ø Financial responsibility — concerns with the customer protection and net capital rules and

Ø AML — focuses on introducing firms to assess anti-money laundering programs

New and emerging issues and initiatives

Ø Exchange Act Rule 15c3-5 — concerns the application of the market access rule

Ø Suitability of variable annuity buybacks — will focus on the suitability of offers by firms to repurchase products and the requirement that a new variable product be purchased and

Ø Fixed income market — centers on a number of issues including market structure and its impact on the quality of executions and similar issues

Market oversight exam program

Ø Oversight of FINRA — reviews examination areas outlined in Dodd-Frank, Section 964

Ø Exchange examinations — conducts risk targeted exams focused on identifying perceived control weaknesses

Ø New registrants – focuses on pre-launch reviews of new areas and

Ø Section 31 fee examinations — an annual review of controls, policies and procedures to ensure accuracy

Clearance and settlement exam program

Clearing agencies

Ø Annual exams — those mandated by Dodd-Frank is conducted

Ø Other exams – conducted using a risk based approach and

Ø New registrants — examines pre-launch entities

Transfer agents

Ø Core activities — examines for compliance with the pertinent rules

Ø Other areas — includes agents that service microcap securities and private offerings and policies and procedures for handling and transferring certain certificates

Ø Direct registration system — assesses the policies and procedures of the firm in this new area and

Ø Business continuity and disaster recovery plans — reviews the adequacy of the plans in this area.

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One of the basic tenants of the new SEC “get tough/omnipresent” policy is winning at trial. Courtroom wins earn the program respect, aiding the overall enforcement effort. Yet the Commission seems to have difficulty doing that. Despite what the agency claims is a good courtroom track record, there is little doubt that in recent major cases the SEC has not done well, losing three of four cases – losses in Primary Reserve Fund, Cuban and Stoker; win in Tourre.

Now the Commission has lost another trial. Following a two day bench trial on insider trading charges in SEC v. Schvacho, Civil Action No. 1:12-cv-02557 (N.D. Ga. Decision on Jan. 7, 2014) the Court found against the agency and in favor of the defendant in findings which suggest the positions of the agency were less than credible.

Schvacho is an action against Ladislav or Larry Schvacho, a retired employee of Cisco Systems. It centers on claims that Mr. Schvacho misappropriated material, non-public information from his long time friend Larry Enterline, CEO of Comsys IT Partners Inc., regarding its then pending acquisition by Manpower, Inc., announced on February 2, 2010. Specifically, in advance of that announcement Mr. Schvacho was alleged to have built a significant position in the shares of Comsys while in possession of inside information he was either told in confidence by, or overheard from, his friend.

The Commission’s claims were based on inferences from repeated communications and contacts between the two men which included numerous telephone calls, several text messages, a dinner, a boat trip and a meeting at the airport. The Commission did not have evidence regarding the content of the communications between the two men. Following the announcement of the deal Mr. Ladislav sold his shares of Comsys, garnering profits of over $500,000.

In support of its claims that Mr. Schvacho violated Exchange Act Sections 10(b) and 14(e) the “SEC offers two evidentiary theories . . . (1) that Enterline confided to Schvacho material, non-public information about Comsys and its business plan . . . or (2) that Schavcho obtained material non-pubic information from Enterline indirectly by, for example, overhearing Enterline’s communications with third parties or by accessing confidential information about the potential acquisition that Enterline may have left in a briefcase . . .” according to the findings of the Court.

Central to the SEC’s claims was a pattern of communications and contacts, events regarding the progress of the transaction and securities purchases described this way by the Court: “The SEC’s evidence at trial largely focused on records of times of telephone calls and text messages between Schvaccho and Enterline . . . The SEC juxtaposes the stock purchases and sales with these phone calls, arguing that a ‘pattern’ exists between conversations and stock transactions . . .” that establishes insider trading such as:

Call: November 7, 2009, after the deal discussions had commenced, Mr. Enterline telephoned Mr. Schvacho for 6 minutes;

Call: November 9, 2009 Mr. Enterline called Mr. Schvacho for eleven minutes;

Purchase: November 10, 2009 Mr. Schvacho purchased 1,900 shares of Comsys stock

Deal event: On November 11, 2009 Comsys’ board held its regular quarterly board meeting and discussed the potential deal;

Purchase: On November 11, 2009 Mr. Schvcho purchased 1,400 shares of Comsys;

Text message: On November 11, 2009 after the market closed Mr. Enterline sent a text message to Mr. Schvacho;

Call: On November 11, 2009 after the text message Mr. Schvacho called Mr. Enterline for 7 minutes;

Deal event: On November 12, 2009 Mr. Enterline called Manpower’s CFO to discuss the deal;

Purchase: On November 12, 2009 Mr. Schvacho purchased 5,500 shares of Comsys stock;

Call: On November 13, 2009 Mr. Enterline called Mr. Schavcho for 6 minutes; and

Purchase: On November 13, 2009 Mr. Schvacho purchased 400 shares of Comsys stock.

This pattern repeated during the term of the negotiations regarding the acquisition, although many of the phone calls cited were for 1 minute which meant that in fact that there was no actual conversation but only a call. In addition, the Commission established that in mid-December the two men drove from Atlanta to St. Petersburg, Florida and then sailed Mr. Enterline’s boat from that city to Fort Myers, Florida. During the trip Mr. Enterline had a brief case with him that he kept in his bunk. Later that month Mr. Schvacho picked up Mr. Enterline at the Atlanta airport.

Analyzing the SEC’s claims, the Court concluded that the claimed pattern was insufficient to establish insider trading. The Court went on to find that while “this timing is interesting it is not persuasive and does not meet the SEC’s burden of proof. . . The evidence was that Enterline and Schvacho spoke with each other with enormous frequently abut matters that Enterline and Schvacho acknowledge concerned mainly their personal relationship and sometimes about the common business venture in which they were involved . . .” Perhaps more importantly the “SEC did not present any evidence, including phone records, to show that the frequency or pattern of communications and the times when Enterline and Schvacho were together was any different during the period when the SEC contends that insider information was misappropriated by Schvacho than it was before the insider trading allegedly began.”

The Court also rejected the Commission’s claims that Mr. Schvacho may have obtained inside information about the deal during either a dinner the two men had or the sailing trip by overhearing conversations Mr. Enterline had with others. To the contrary, the SEC failed to call any witness to support this supposition.

The Court also rejected the Commission’s claims that the inside information may have been obtained from Mr. Enterline’s brief case. Mr. Enterline testified that “the briefcase he had did not have merger business documents in it, that it was stored in his sleeping compartment at the bow end of the boat in a locker, and that there was no evidence anyone had accessed it. To the contrary, the arguments of the agency only illustrate the “overreaching, self-serving interpretation that the SEC imposed on the evidence presented at trial,” according to the Court.

Finally, the Court found the testimony of Messrs. Evterline and Schvacho credible. There was nothing to contradict Mr. Evterline’s statements that he did not furnish Mr. Schvacho inside information or even know that he had purchased shares in the firm during the negotiation period or during an earlier period, both of which caused him concern and ultimately strained the relationship.

While the Commission tried to undermine the credibility of Mr. Schvacho’s denials of insider trading, it failed. Indeed, Mr. Schvacho’s testimony established that in a period prior to the deal negotiations he had purchased company shares and liquidated them. He also testified that he never told his friend about any of the purchases because of concern that it might undermine their friendship.

In the end the Court found that the SEC wholly failed to offer any evidence about the communications between the two men. Quoting SEC v. Rorech, 720 F. Supp. 2nd 367, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)(another bench trial where the Court rejected SEC insider trading charges) the Court concluded that “’Potential access [however] to material, nonpublic information, without more, is insufficient to prove the defendant . . .’” actually did possess it and engaged in inside information.

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