The decision in Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 06-41, which will be handed down later this term following argument yesterday before the Supreme Court, has been widely viewed as potentially the most important securities private damage action in years. It may be. Potential is not always actual, however. Indeed, many of the questions from the Justices yesterday suggested that the decision in Stoneridge may be an important decision, but not the decision of the decade.

At issue in Stoneridge is who may be held liable in a private damage action under Section 10(b) – that is, can business partners be held liable as part of a scheme to defraud with the primary violator public company? The resolution of this question has been closely watched by many, including business groups and shareholder advocates.

Plaintiffs relied on a theory of “scheme liability” (discussed in our earlier posting here), drawn from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006) and an amicus brief of the SEC filed in that case, to argue that the vendors in a barter transaction which Charter Communication used to cook its books were primary violators, liable to Charter’s shareholders. Early in the arguments the Chief Justice raised a key point of concern about plaintiffs’ theory, suggesting it would expand liability under Section 10(b) at a time when the Court should be contracting it: “I mean, we don’t get in this business of implying private rights of action any more. And isn’t the effort by Congress to legislate a good signal that they have kind of picked up the ball and they are running with it and we shouldn’t?” Later Chief Justice Roberts clarified and amplified his comment noting “my suggestion is not that we should go back and say that there is no private right of action. My suggestion is that we should get out of the business of expanding it, because Congress has taken over and is legislating in the area in the way they weren’t back when we implied the right of action under 10(b).” This has been a key theme in a number of the Court’s decisions construing the judicially crafted remedy under Section 10(b).

Similarly the Chief Justice, along with Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Alito, raised a number of questions about the difference between scheme liability and aiding and abetting, which the Court held in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) was not covered by the statute. The exchanges with counsel for plaintiffs on this issue prompted Justice Alito at one point to comment that “I see absolutely no difference between your test and the elements of aiding and abetting.” Justice Kennedy amplified this statement, noting that “there are any number of kickbacks and mismanagements and petty fraud that go on in the business, and business people know that any publicly held company’s shares are going to be affected by its profits, so I see no limits” to plaintiffs’ theory of scheme liability. A bright line and predictable result was a key point in Central Bank, and has been a theme of the Court’s 10(b) jurisprudence in recognition of the potential harm caused by frivolous securities fraud damage suits.

Respondents focused on the language of the statute. The complaint here, defendants argued, is little more than rendering substantial assistance to another who is making a false statement. This position prompted Justice Ginsburg to note that silence is, in fact, the point: “That’s the essence of the scheme. You said that they – they are home free because they didn’t themselves make any statement to investors. But they set up Charter to make those statements, to swell its revenues – revenues that it in fact didn’t have.”

In a series of questions which may suggest that the Justices are looking for a compromise position between the extremes of the parties, Justice Ginsburg asked whether there is some kind of middle ground between primary violator and aider and abettor: “That’s if they are aiders and abettors, which is what Congress covered [in Section 20e of the Exchange Act]. And I again go back to see if there is another category or is everyone – either Charter, the person whose stock is at stake, the company whose stock is at stake and everyone else is an aider?” Later Justice Kennedy raised essentially the same issue by asking defense counsel if, under the common law of torts, there was a category between primary violator and aider and abettor. Justice Souter echoed this theroy a short while later by asking whether there was “overlap” between the two categories – that is, some kind of common ground which would, in fact, be a third category.

As the arguments came to a conclusion, a series of questions may have suggested the potential basis the Justices are considering for their decision. First, Justice Stevens asked defense counsel whether reliance is an element of a private cause of action or an element of a statutory violation. Defense counsel noted that it is an element of a private action – a response drawn straight out of the Court’s Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., v. Broude, 544 U.S. 356 (2005) decision two years ago (discussed in our posting here).  Next, defense counsel, who argued that the SEC should bring actions such as this one, essentially admitted that a government enforcement action could not really substitute for a damage action here in terms of compensating shareholders, since the Sarbanes Oxley fair funds provision could probably not be used in this case. Finally, the Chief Justice, in a comment echoed later by Justice Ginsburg, noted that the decision below was based on a determination that there was no deceptive act, not a lack of reliance. These questions may suggest the Court will not consider the reliance issue, which is a key part of the defense argument, as well as that of the Solicitor General.

While it is always prudent not to read to much into questions by the Justices, the arguments today may suggest that Stoneridge will leave the blockbuster decision to another day. To be sure, the Court raised key themes from its earlier cases about implied causes of action, the difference between aiding and abetting and a primary violation, and the lack of certainty of application offered by plaintiffs’ scheme liability theory. At the same time, repeated questions searching for a middle ground and concerning the fact that the lower court did not consider a key part of the arguments relied on by defendants and the Solicitor General suggest that the Court may opt for a narrow ground of decision focused on the what type of conduct – affirmative statement, deception, silence – violates the statute. In that event, the Court could leave the application of those principles for another day, just as it did last June in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499 (2007) (discussed here).  No doubt Stoneridge will be an important decision. It may not, however, be the decision of the decade.

 

This series has examined the impact or potential impact of three key Supreme Court decisions on private securities fraud damage actions under Section 10(b).  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499 (2007) and Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., v. Broude, 544 U.S. 356 (2005) have been decided.  Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. and Motorola, Inc., No. 06-43 will be argued on October 9.  Tellabs and Dura are already having a significant impact, generally making it more difficult for plaintiffs to plead and prove a securities fraud action. Stoneridge is widely expected to be the most important decision in this area in years and will almost certainly continue the trend of its predecessors.

As the Supreme Court prepares to hear and resolve the case, it will not be at a loss for views, theory and argument.  Not only does the Court have the briefs of the parties, but also 31 amicus briefs.  Those briefs include parties from Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 2007); Pet. For Cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3557 (March 5, 2007) (No. 06-13) (the Enron class actions), arguing their positions, the solicitor general supporting the defendants, and groups of former SEC Commissions arguing each side, along with a variety of business and investor groups.  The SEC was not permitted to file a brief, but its theory of scheme liability, a variation of which was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006), is being presented.

What is at issue in Stoneridge is the way business is conducted.  In Stoneridge as well as Enron, Simpson and other similar cases, the basic allegations patterns involve entities in business deals with a public company which books the transaction in a manner which defrauds its shareholders.  Those supporting plaintiffs claim that the parties, acting with the public company in those deals, have defrauded the shareholders.  Those supporting the defendants claim that parties to a business transaction are not responsible for how the public company books a deal or communicates that deal to its shareholders. 

As the Supreme Court considers Stoneridge, the themes of Tellabs, Dura and the predecessor of StoneridgeCentral Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) – will be key to the decision.  The Court can be expected to begin any analysis of the scope of liability under Section 10(b) by closely reading the statutory language.  This approach is particularly evident in Central Bank, which is little more than a reading of the text of Section 10(b) to conclude that the words “aiding and abetting” are not in the statute. 

At the same time, the Court is keenly aware of the fact that the cause of action under Section 10(b) has been implied by the courts and not created by Congress.  This theme is evident, for example, in Dura, where the Court traced back to traditional common law fraud elements to craft its loss causation theory.  In this context, the Court will be aware of the fact that following Central Bank Congress restored aiding and abetting liability for SEC enforcement actions, but not private damage cases.  The Court’s concern here ties to its close focus on the literal language of the statute to create a restrictive view of liability under Section 10(b), despite the fact that it is viewed as a “catch-all” antifraud provision.

Another key theme from Central Bank, Dura and Tellabs is notice and predictability.  Collectively, these cases evidence a kind of “bright line” approach to liability which aids planning for business transactions and decisions.  The concern for predictability and the impact of securities damage suits on business it driven in part by recognition of the havoc abusive, frivolous securities suits can cause as documented in the legislative history of the PSLRA.

As the Supreme Court considers and decides Stoneridge, these themes from Central Bank, Dura and Tellabs can be expected to significantly influence the decision.  Viewing Stoneridge through these themes suggests that the decision will be carefully drawn, tied closely to the statutory language and the elements the Court has crafted over the years for a Section 10(b) claim.  What may ultimately be the key to the decision however, will be the quest for predictability and the necessity for a bright line test, underscored by a concern regarding the impact of frivolous suits based on a court-created cause of action.