Last week, the Commission filed a settled administrative proceeding based on alleged violations of the FCPA. It named Faro Technologies, Inc. as a Respondent. In the Matter of Faro Technologies, Inc., Adm. File No. 3-13059 (June 5, 2008). One more settled FCPA bribery case might seem relatively routine at a time when the SEC and DOJ are focusing on enforcement in this area. There is more to this case however, than might first appear.

The facts are straightforward. According to the Order, Faro Technologies is a software development and manufacturing company based in Florida. In early 2003, the company established Faro-China, a wholly owned subsidiary, to sell its products in China. Previously, the company had sold products in China through a distributor. Sales in the subsidiary were directed by the Sales Director. The Sales Director hired a former employee of the company’s Chinese distributor as the Country Sales Manager.

Subsequently, the Country Sales Manager communicated to three Faro officers, including the Sales Director, a request to do business the “Chinese way,” that is, to pay kickbacks to potential customers. The Faro officers consulted with their Chinese counsel who informed them that such payments may well violate China’s anti-bribery laws. Accordingly, the Faro officers told the Sales Director and Country Manager not to make the payments.

Nevertheless, between 2004 and 2005, the Sales Director authorized the Country manager to make the illegal payments. The Sales Director also instructed Faro’s China sub staff to alter account entries in an effort to cover up the payments.

In February 2005, a new Faro officer e-mailed a news article to all of the international business units. The article described the prosecution of another U.S. company for paying bribes in China. The e-mail noted that they should take appropriate precautions to comply with U.S. law. The clipping was specifically directed to the Sales Director with instructions to have it translated and distributed to the staff at the Chinese subsidiary. After the dissemination of the article, the Sales Director reiterated his authorization for the payments.

Based on these facts, the SEC filed a cease and desist proceeding against the company. That action was resolved with the entry of an order directing that the company cease and desist from violations of the anti-bribery sections and requiring the payment of disgorgement, prejudgment interest and compliance with its undertakings regarding retention of a monitor.

Clearly Faro initially took the right steps. They obtained a legal opinion from local counsel and, when it appeared the payments were illegal under local law, directed that they not be made. Later, the company reinforced its instruction with the circulation of the news clip.

Nevertheless, the Commission exercised its discretion to charge the company, concluding that its agents had in fact paid the bribes and that the company had inadequate internal controls and books and records. No doubt the bribes were paid, although one might question the prosecutorial decision here.

Even more suspect is the internal controls conclusion. The company had rogue agents that disregarded repeated directives and concealed the bookkeeping entries. The Commission’s conclusion here seems like little more than fraud by hindsight, which is no fraud at all. See, e.g., Denny v. Barber, 575 F.2d 465, 470 (2nd Cir. 1978) (classic statement of Judge Friendly rejecting fraud by hindsight); see also Higginbotham v. Baxter International, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 760 (7th Cir. 2007) (“That’s no news [that the controls cannot prevent fraud]; by definition, all fraud demonstrate the ‘inadequacy’ of existing controls, just as all bank robberies demonstrate the failure of bank security and all burglaries demonstrate the failure of locks and alarm systems”). So too, the payment of the bribes at the China sub – covered by phony entries – standing alone says little about the adequacy of the internal controls and the books and records.

There is more, however. The SEC also concluded that Faro simply had not done enough to prevent FCPA violations: “During the period of the improper payments described above, Faro provided no training or education to any of its employees, agents, or subsidiaries regarding the requirements of the FCPA. Faro also failed to establish a program to monitor its employees, agents, and subsidiaries for compliance with the FCPA.” This finding can only be viewed as critical to the prosecutorial decision making process here. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the company was doing business in a high risk country such as China and its employees had raised the issue of doing business “the Chinese way.” See also SEC v. Lucent Technologies, Civil Action No. 07-092301 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 2007) (settled FCPA action in which SEC noted lack of training).

Any issuer reading this opinion should look beyond the booking findings and focus on the clear message: FCPA training and compliance programs are essential for those doing business overseas, particularly in areas of high risk.

Following the introduction of this new occasional series last week (here), we begin our examination of trends in securities class action litigation with a look at key statistics.

In 2007, there were 163 cases filed, compared to 109 the prior year. Numbers can be deceptive, however. A closer look at the numbers demonstrates that the subprime crisis is having a significant impact. Of the cases filed last year, 29% or 37 actions were tied to the current market crisis. At the same time, the number of securities class actions filed in 2006 may have been down because of the option backdating scandal. Many of those cases were filed as derivative suits, rather than securities class actions.

Perhaps a better way to consider the number of cases filed last year is in comparison to the post–PSLRA average. Since the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995, there has been an average of 191 securities class actions filed each year. Viewed against this yard stick, the number of filings last year decreased significantly, particularly if the subprime cases are excluded. A reduction in the number of cases is consistent with the goals of the PSLRA, which sought to weed out those which lacked merit.

Another key statistic involves settlements. Last year there were 113 settlements, compared to 112 the prior year. The total amount of settlements in 2007 dropped compared to 2006, largely because last year there was only one billion dollar settlement compared to three the prior year.

Last year’s largest settlements were:

Tyco: $3.2 billion
Cardinal Health: $600 million
Delphi Corp.: $333.4 million
CMS Energy: $200 million
Motorola: $190 million

However, if the billion dollar cases are excluded, the average settlement in 2006 was larger than in 2007. In addition, the median settlement for 2007 was higher than in other years, due largely to an increase in settlements in the $10 to $20 million range. This again suggests that a key goal of the PSLRA is being met – less meritorious cases are being weeded out.

The largest settlements are those in which there is a labor pension fund as lead plaintiff, there is a parallel SEC or DOJ action and the allegations are based on accounting issues. Since the PSLRA dramatically altered the rules for selecting a lead plaintiff in favor of institutional investors, this trend is also consistent with the statutory goals.

Finally, most cases are resolved at or around the motion to dismiss stage. To date, 81% of the cases filed since the passage of the PSLRA have been settled. Of those cases, 41% were dismissed while 59% were settled. 60% of those settled were resolved at the motion to dismiss stage.

In contrast, few cases have gone to trial. Since the passage of the PSLRA, only 11 securities class actions have proceeded to trial. Five of those cases resulted in defense verdicts, while four settled during trial. Again, these trends are also consistent with the PSLRA. The Act’s substantive and procedural requirements focus on the motion to dismiss stage of the case. At the same time, the discovery provisions of the Federal Civil Rules, which focus on creating a “level playing field” and disclosure of all relevant information, clearly encourage settlement for those securities class actions which survive the initial pleading and motion to dismiss requirements of the PSLRA. Thus, overall the number of securities class actions being filed has declined since the passage of the PSLRA, but the settlement value of the remaining cases is increasing.

Next: The scope of liability under antifraud Section 10(b), the basic claim in securities class actions