This is the fourth in a series of articles that will be published periodically analyzing the direction of SEC enforcement. Article 1 is here, 2 here and 3 here.

In a recent speech Attorney General Eric Holder emphasized the need to continue to “make use of the full range of parallel criminal and civil enforcement resources to combat financial fraud . . . “ (here). There is no doubt that over the years the SEC and DOJ have tended to work closer. There was a time when the SEC used a formal process under, for example, Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act to refer a matter to the Department of Justice. Under that process the Commission would approve a staff request for the referral. Now, as the SEC Enforcement Manual makes clear, the process is much more likely to be informal and done by the staff. SEC Enforcement Manual, Section 5.6.

Joint working task forces have undoubtedly accelerated this trend. In 2002 in the wake of Enron and other corporate scandals DOJ, the SEC and other law enforcement agencies formed a Financial Fraud Task Force which fostered closer relations. That task force was broadened in November 2009 by an Executive Order from the President. More recently the SEC joined with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia and Virginia state securities officials to form a task force which will concentrate on financial fraud. Those cases will be brought on the “rocket docket” of the Eastern District since the Commission’s electronic filing system is located in that district.

Parallel inquires can benefit all. For the government it offers efficiencies while conserving scarce resources. For those who may become defendants in an enforcement action, it can offer the opportunity for a coordinated resolution. In the FCPA area, for example, there typically are coordinated settlements involving DOJ, the SEC and in some instances other regulators and prosecutorial agencies. The settlement with Chevron Corporation is a good example. There the company simultaneously settled FCPA issues with the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, the SEC, OFAC and the Manhattan District Attorney (here).

At the same time the criminalization of securities enforcement and the blurring of the line between criminal and civil cases appears to be accelerating. Perhaps the best example of this trend is the option backdating cases. The first of these cases were announced at a joint press conference by the SEC and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California in July 2006 centered on backdating at Brocade Communications (here). With the filing of those cases conduct which had not been the focus of even civil enforcement authorities suddenly became criminal. Since the filing of those cases dozens of others have been brought.

The implications of this trend can be significant for defendants. A case concluded last year provides a good example. In SEC v. Davis, Case No. 03-CV6672 (S.D.N.Y. Filed Sept. 4, 2003) the Commission brought insider trading charges against Peter Davis Jr., a financial analyst, John Youngdahl, formerly a vice president at Goldman Sachs and Steven Northern, formerly a manager of several funds for MFS. The charges were based on claims that Mr. Davis tipped the other two defendants and others about information at a treasury auction which was embargoed. All three defendants settled with the SEC. Messrs. Davis and Youngdahl pleaded guilty to criminal charges. Mr. Youngahl, who convinced the SEC to dismiss its case against him in Manhattan but later settled in a similar action filed in Boston, was not charged criminally. There is no apparent explanation for the difference in the charges (here).

These trends also have serious implications for law enforcement. In view the increased use of parallel proceedings, securities practitioners have little choice but to defend every investigation as if it is criminal. This approach is fully consistent with the SEC’s Enforcement Manual which instructs staff attorneys conducting investigations to tell defense counsel asking about possible parallel criminal inquiries to review Release 1662, the Commission’s standard set of warning. Stated differently, defense counsel is told to “assume the worst.” See generally, SEC Enforcement Manual, Section 5.2.1.

Yet defending every civil inquiry as if it were criminal can significantly compromise the ability of a client to cooperate with enforcement authorities. At the same time this approach can have a negative impact on the ability of law enforcement to effectively complete its inquiry. It may also undercut the new cooperation initiatives of the SEC introduced in January 2010.

These trends can also result in overreaching. The distinction between a “willful” violation which is criminal under Exchange Act Section 32(a), for example, and “scienter” for a civil violation of the antifraud statutes is virtually non-existent. Compare U.S. v. Tarallo, 380 F.3rd 1174, 1188 (9th Cir. 2004)(defining willfully to mean the defendant knew the conduct was wrongful) and U.S. v. King, 351 F. 3rd 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2004)(deliberate ignorance is sufficient for conviction) with Ernst & Ernst v. Hockfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)(scienter required for Section 10(b)) and Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F. 3d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977)(scienter includes recklessness).

A graphic example of overreaching came out of the cases centered on the option backdating at Broadcom Corporation. There DOJ and the SEC brought charges against the cofounders of the company, Henry Samueli and Henry Nicholas, and its former president William Rhuele. U.S. v. Samueli, Case No. 10-500024 (C.D. Cal.); U.S. v. Nicholas, Case No. 10-50005 (C.D. Cal.). Mr. Samueli eventually pleaded guilty in the criminal case to an obstruction charge. Later however, after listening to Mr. Samueli testify for two days during the trial of Mr. Nicholas, the court not only vacated the plea but dismissed all charges against both men based on prosecutorial misconduct (here). Early this year the sad saga of these cases came to an end when the government agreed to drop its appeal of the dismissal ruling (here).

Another but less dramatic example of this trend occurred in the simultaneous criminal and civil prosecutions of former OMB director David Stockman which concluded last year. U.S. v. Stockman (S.D.N.Y.); SEC v. Collins & Aikman, Civil Action No. 07-CV-24019 (S.D.N.Y. Filed March 27, 2007). Each action alleged that Mr. Stockman and others engaged in fraudulent schemes and falsified the financial statements of Collins & Aikman while he was Chairman and CEO of that company. Eventually the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Manhattan decided to drop all charges based on evidence furnished by Mr. Stockman (here).

The SEC pursued its case. In the end however the agency dropped its most serious fraud charges (here). Mr. Stockman resolved the case by consenting to an injunction based on Securities Act Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) as well as various reporting, record keeping and certification provisions. While the injunction included a provision regarding lying to the auditors and the deal required the payment of disgorgement and a civil fine, all of the intentional fraud claims were dropped by the SEC. The settlement clearly does not reflect the multiple claims of intentional fraud detailed in the civil complaint or the criminal indictment which received widespread publicity when brought.

Chief Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently penned an opinion in U.S. v. Goyal, No. 08-10436 (9th Cir. 2010) which succinctly summarizes the carnage caused by this kind of prosecutorial overreaching. Concurring in the reversal of a financial fraud case for a lack of evidence the Chief Judge noted that “This case has consumed an inordinate amount of taxpayer resources, and has no doubt devastated the defendant’s personal and professional life. The defendant’s former employer also paid a price, footing a multimillion dollar bill for the defense. And, in the end, the government couldn’t prove that the defendant engaged in any criminal conduct . . . This is not the way criminal law is suppose to work. Civil law often covers conduct that falls in a gray area of arguable legality. But criminal law should clearly separate conduct that is criminal from conduct that is legal . . .This is not only because of the dire consequences of conviction . . .but also because criminal law represents the community’s sense of the type of behavior that merits the moral condemnation of society . . When prosecutors have to stretch the law or the evidence to secure a conviction, as they did here, it can hardly be said that such moral judgment is warranted.” (emphasis original).

Next: The Supreme Court and The Reach of SEC Enforcement

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission issued its report this week noting that the crisis was avoidable, there was a widespread failure of financial regulation and a systematic breakdown in accountability and ethics. At the same time the SEC continued to issue regulations under Dodd-Frank and sent a study to congress on standards for those who give investment advice.

Insider trading continued to be a key focus of regulators with more Galleon related cases being filed. A prison sentence was handed down in an FSA insider trading case. The SEC also settled another FCPA action.

The CFTC conducted a sweep, filing suits against fourteen firms in four courts. These are the first suits to enforce the new forex regulations which went into effect last fall.

Market reform

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission issued its report on the financial crisis. The report details the findings of the Commission regarding the causes of the crisis. The Commission was not charged by congress with making recommendations for legislation.

The overall conclusions of the Inquiry Commission are:

• The crisis was avoidable

• Widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s financial markets

• A combination of excessive borrowing, risky investment, and lack of transparency put the financial system on a collision course with crisis

• The government was ill-prepared for the crisis, and its inconsistent response added to the uncertainty and panic in the financial markets

• There was a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics

• Mortgage-lending standards and the mortgage securitization pipeline lit and spread the flame of contagion and crisis

• Over-the-counter derivatives contributed significantly to this crisis

• The failures of credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction

The SEC continued to issue rules to implement Dodd-Frank this week. These include:

• Say-on-Pay: The Commission adopted rules regarding shareholder approval of executive compensation and golden parachute compensation arrangements. Under these rules companies will be required to specify that say-on-pay votes will occur at lest every three years. They will also be required to hold a “frequency” vote at least every six years to permit shareholder to decide how often they want to be presented with the say-on-pay vote. Additional disclosures will also be required regarding “golden parachute” compensation.

• Accredited investors: The SEC proposed rules for the adoption of new standards for accredited investors which would exclude the value of the investor’s primary residence in determining net worth.

• Disclosure by private funds: The Commission proposed rules which would require a registered investment adviser who manages one or more private funds to periodically furnish certain information which would remain confidential. The information is for use by the Financial Stability Oversight Council in monitoring risk to the U.S. financial system.

The Commission also released a staff Study Recommending a Uniform Fiduciary Stand of Conduct for Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers. The study proposes that the standard be at least as stringent as the current standard for investment advisers under the Advisers Act. Commissioners Kathleen Casey and Torey Paredes opposed the release of the study arguing it does not fulfill the statutory mandate of Section 913 of Dodd-Frank which requires it to evaluate the effectiveness of existing legal and regulatory standards on this subject.

SEC Enforcement

Insider trading: SEC v. Cardillo, Civil Action No. 11-CV-11 civ 0549 (S.D.N.Y. Filed Jan 26, 2011). Michael Curdillo, a former trader at Gelleon Management, LP is alleged to have traded while in possession of inside information in violation of Exchange Act Section 10(b). The information concerned the acquisitions of 3Com and Axcan. As a result of that trading the fund made over $730,000 in trading profits. The information traces to two Ropes and Grey associates, Arthur Cutillo and Brien Santarias, who misappropriated it. They then tipped Zivi Goffer, a former trader at Schottenfeld Group LLC known as “Octopussy” because of his many sources of information. Mr. Goffer in turn furnished the information to a trader who worked in the Galleon offices, who furnished it to Mr. Cardillo. Previously, Mr. Cardillo pleaded guilty to criminal charges. The SEC case is in litigation.

Insider trading: SEC v. Smith, Civil Action No. 11-CV-0535 (S.D.N.Y. Filed Jan. 26, 2011) is an action against Adam Smith, a former portfolio manger of the Galleon Emerging Technology funds. The complaint states that Mr. Smith obtained inside information about the take over of ATI Technologies, Inc. by Advanced Micro Devices Inc. The information came from a source that Mr. Smith had known for years. While in possession of the information Mr. Smith caused the Galleon funds he advised to purchase ATI shares. Those shares were later sold at a profit of over $1.3 million. The complaint alleges a violation of Exchange Act Section 10(b). The case is in litigation.

In the matter of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-14204 (Jan. 25, 2011) alleges that the firm misused customer order information, charged certain customers undisclosed trading fees and failed to maintain proper records in violation of Exchange Act Sections 15(c)(1)(A), 15(g) and 17(a). The conduct on which the Order is based occurred from 2002 through 2007 and centers on three types of transactions. The first concerned the use of certain customer order information by the firm’s proprietary Equity Strategy Desk. The second involved improper mark-up and mark-down charges on orders for certain institutional and high net worth individuals, contrary to the firm’s representations to those customers. Finally, in some instances during the time period Merrill agreed to guarantee a customer a specific per-share execution price or a price tied to an agreed upon benchmark. The firm however failed to record them in writing as required by Section 17(a)(1). As a result of this conduct Merrill violated not only the Sections cited above but it also failed to reasonably supervise persons subject to its supervision as required by Section 15(b)(4)(E). To resolve the matter Merrill consented to the entry of a cease and desist order and agreed to pay a $10 million civil penalty.

Market manipulation: SEC v. Metcalf, Civil Action No. 11 Civ 0493 (S.D.N.Y. Filed Jan. 24, 2011) is an action against Christopher Metalf, Bonzidar Vukovich and Pantera Petroleum, Inc. alleging violations of Securities Act Section 17(a) and Exchange Act Section 10(b). The complaint claims that Mr. Metcalf, the president and CEO of Pantera, and Mr. Vukovich engaged in a scheme to manipulate the price of Pantera shares. Specifically, the Commission alleged that in March and August 2008 defendant Vukovich provided detailed instructions to a person identified only as Individual A to purchase blocks of Pantera stock using matched trades. Individual A, and the registered representatives he supposedly represented, claimed to have discretion over the accounts of wealthy individuals. The individual defendants promised Individual A a 30% kickback on the transactions. The case is in litigation.

Insider trading: SEC v. Nacchio, Civ. No. 05-cv-480 (D. Colo.) is an action against former Quest Communications CEO Joseph Nacchio, discussed here. This week the court entered a final judgment against Mr. Nacchio. In the settlement Mr. Nacchio consented to the entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting future violations of Securities Act Section 17(a) and Exchange Act Sections 10(b), 13(b)(5) and from aiding and abetting violations of Sections 13(a), 13(b)(2). He also agreed to disgorge $44,632,464 and interest. No penalty was assessed in view of the result in the related criminal case.

Insider trading: SEC v. Fan, Case No. C11-0096 (W.D. WA. Filed Jan. 18, 2011) is an action against Defendants Zizhong (James) Fan and Zishen (Brandon) Fan and relief defendant Junhua Fan, all relatives (here). James was employed at biotech company Seattle Genetics as the manager of clinical programming. Brandon resides in Chino Hills, California while Junhua lives in Beijing, China. James and his team were involved in clinical trials for a drug known as SGN-35, a product to treat Hodgkin’s lymphoma. His direct reports had access to data about the trials in July and August 2010. Between August 24 and September 24, 2010 Brandon is alleged to have purchased over 2,750 Seattle Genetics options at a cost of $360,000. The contracts were acquired through Junhua’s account. During this same period James repeatedly attended meetings involving the key trial on the drug and the late September deadline for disclosing those results to the public. On September 27 the company issued a press release and conducted a webcast to disclose the results The price for company shares increased about 18%. Brandon liquidated the options at a profit of $803,000 over the next month. Subsequently the SEC staff contacted both defendants on January 13, 2011. Over the next few days there were repeated efforts to transfer the money first to a domestic account and later to a bank in China. James also announced he was leaving for China. The Commission filed an action alleging violations of Exchange Act Section 10(b) and obtained a temporary freeze order. The case is in litigation.

Sale of unregistered securities: SEC v. Wall Street Communications, Inc., Civil Action No. 8:09-cv-1046 (M.D. Fla.) is an action against Howard Scalia and his company, Wall Street Communications as well as Ross Barall and Donald McKelvey. The complaint alleged manipulative schemes including one in which Wall Street and Mr. Scalia acquired large blocks of thinly-traded microcap companies for little or no consideration and then created a market for the shares using either spam emails or coordinated manipulative trading with accounts controlled by Mr. Barall. The second scheme was alleged to have involved the illegal acquisition of 8.6 million shares of Telco-Technology under a Form S-8 registration statement. After acquiring the shares they were allegedly sold in a fraudulent unregistered offering with half of the proceeds going to a company controlled by Mr. McKelvey. The complaint alleged violations of Securities Act Sections 5 and 17(a) and Exchange Act Sections 10(b). This week the Commission settled with Defendant McKelvey who agreed to the entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting future violations of Securities Act Sections 5, 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3). Questions regarding disgorgement, prejudgment interest and a civil penalty are reserved for the court. The Commission dropped all scienter based charges.

Rule 105, Reg M: In the Matter of Horseman Capital Management, L.P., Adm. Proc. File No. 3-14202 (Jan. 24, 2011) is a proceeding naming as a Respondent Horseman Capital, a London based partnership which manages four funds, two of which are in the U.S. The firm is registered with the FSA in the U.K. According to the Order, from the middle of 2007 through the summer of 2008 Respondent maintained short positions in the stocks of several financial institutions including Merrill Lynch. On July 29, 2008 Merrill shares were sold in a follow-on offering. During the restricted period Respondent increased its short position in Merrill by 75,000 shares. This violated Rule 105 of Reg M which generally prohibits the purchase of securities in an offering if that person sold short the security during the restricted period. To resolve the proceeding Respondent consented to the entry of an order directing that it cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Rule 105 of Regulation M. The order also directed Respondent to pay disgorgement of $1,295,138 along with prejudgment interest and to pay a civil penalty of $65,000.

CFTC

The Commission filed actions against fourteen foreign currency firms in a nationwide sweep. The actions were brought simultaneously in Chicago, the District of Columbia, Kansas City and New York. Twelve of the cases allege that the firm acted as a Foreign Exchange Dealer without registering with the Commission. Each of the cases claims that the defendant solicited or accepted orders from U.S. investors to enter into forex transactions in violation of the Act. These are the first actions brought by the FTC to enforce the new forex regulations which became effective in October 2010. The cases are in litigation.

Criminal cases

U.S. v. Lang (E.D.N.Y.) is an action naming as defendant William Lang, president of Harbor Funding Group, Inc. and Joseph Pascua, the president of Black Sand Mine, Inc. The indictment charges each defendant with conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud and securities and wire fraud. It is based on two alleged schemes. One is an advance fee scheme in which the defendants told land developers who had clients seeking to build houses in regions affected by Hurricane Katrina that Harbor Funding had funds to lend in return for the payment of an advance fee. About $9 million was raised from 300 individuals. In fact the defendants did not have the funds to lend but kept the fees. In the second the defendants induced investors to invest in Black Sand Mine claiming it was starting to mine gold and other precious metals on Sitkinak Island in Alaska. The marketing was done through webinars and in person presentations. The representations were fraudulent.

FCPA

SEC v. Jennings, Case No. 1:11-cv-00144 (Filed Jan. 24, 2011) is a settled FCPA action against Paul W. Jennings, the former CFO and CEO of Innospec, Inc. The complaint focuses on two key schemes. One involves Iraq and in part the U.N. Oil for Food Program while the other is based on bribes paid in Indonesia. In Iraq the company began paying bribes to sell its fuel additive as early as 2000. In 2001 it began paying bribes in connection with the U.N. program. In Iraq the company paid bribes, according to the court papers, totaling over $1.6 million and promised more than $880,000 in illegal payments. The company also paid for gifts, entertainment and travel. In Indonesia Innospec is alleged to have paid bribes from about 2000 through 2005 to obtain about $48.5 million in contracts from state owned oil and gas companies. Defendant Jennings is alleged to have been involved with some of the bribery schemes beginning in late 2004. He also failed to report the bribes involved in the U.N. program to the auditors after learning about them. Mr. Jennings settled the action by consenting to the entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting future violations of Exchange Act Sections 30A, and 13(b)(5) and from aiding and abetting Innospec’s violations of Exchange Act Sections 30A, 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B). He also agreed to disgorge $116,092 along with prejudgment interest and to pay a civil penalty of $100,000. The settlement considers the cooperation of Mr. Jennings.

Antonio Perez, the former controller of a Florida based telecommunications company, was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison based on FCPA violations. The court also directed that Mr. Perez serve two years of supervised release following the prison term and forfeit $36,375. Mr. Perez admitted that he conspired to bribe officials from Telecommunications D’Hati to obtain business. He also admitted to conspiring with Juan Diaz and Robert Antoine, the former director of International relations for Telecommunications D’Hati. Mr.Perez stated that he was personally involved with two bribe payments totaling the amount of the forfeiture.

Court of appeals

Dronsejko v. Grant Thornton, Nos. 09-4222 and 10-4074 (10th Cir. Jan. 20, 2011) is a securities class action against the auditors of iMergent. The complaint centered on an alleged improper revenue recognition scheme at the company between October 2002 and October 2005 which materially overstated revenue and resulted in a restatement of the financial statements. Specifically, the claims were based on the revenue recognition policy of the company. Under that policy revenue could be recognized on the sale of licenses based on Extended Payment Term Arrangements under certain circumstances. GAAP permits such recognition if there is persuasive evidence of an arrangement, the delivery of the product has occurred, the fee is fixed and determinable and collectability is probable. Here the company recognized 100% of the revenue from these arrangements despite the fact that it collected on average only 53% of the total purchase price. In its 2003 and 2004 10Ks the firm stated that 47% of its extended payment term sales were uncollectable. The SEC had told the company that the collection rate had to be substantially more than 50% to recognize the revenue. Plaintiffs claimed that the unqualified audit opinions of the defendant were false and misleading. The district court dismissed the case, concluding that plaintiffs had failed to adequately plead a strong inference of scienter. The circuit court affirmed.

Initially the circuit court noted that the third, fourth, sixth and ninth circuits had developed a recklessness standard specifically for Section 10(b) claims involving outside auditors. This standard is “especially stringent” and requires “a mental state so culpable that it approximates an actual intent to aid in the fraud being perpetrated by the audited company.” (internal quotes omitted). Here the court concluded that it need not consider this issue since under any standard the complaint is deficient. The issue raised here is based on a claim that although the audit firm knew the facts about the collection rate, that it was reckless in concluding that a 53% collection rate constituted “probable collectability” under the applicable principles which do not define those terms. While various sources use different definitions of “probable collectability” the court held that the failure of the audit firm to use those sources does not constitute recklessness. Likewise the magnitude of the restatement is of no import since it does not speak to the issue of recklessness. Indeed, it is well established that GAAP violations only support a claim of scienter when coupled with evidence of the defendant’s fraudulent intent to mislead investors. That is not the case here.

FSA

Suitability: Barclays Bank plc was fined about $11.5 million by the agency for failures in relation to the sale of two funds. From July 2006 through November 2008 the bank sold Aviva’s Global Balanced Income Fund and Global Cautious Income Fund to 12,331 investors for over $1 billion. In connection with these sales the bank failed to ensure the funds were suitable for customers, did not give adequate training to its sales staff, failed to ensure that materials provided to customers clearly explained the risks and did not have adequate procedures to monitor the sales process. Approximately one in seven investors have complained. Barclays has been conducting a review of the sales and has paid over $25 million in compensation. The FSA estimates up to $65 million more may need to be paid to customers

Insider trading: Neil Rollins, former senior manager of PM Onboard Limited, was sentenced following a verdict finding him guilty of insider trading. Mr. Rollins has been found guilty on five counts of insider dealing and four counts of money laundering. The trading followed the acquisition by Mr. Rollins of information suggesting his company would have poor financial results. He traded in shares of his company prior to the announcement of the results. He also encouraged his wife to do the same. When the FSA began its inquiry he laundered the proceeds in an effort to conceal his activities. The court sentenced him to 27 months in prison and order him to pay almost $300,000 in confiscation.