Since the FCPA only applies to foreign officials, the definition of that term is critical to the application of the statute. Government enforcement officials have routinely included with the definition state owned enterprises and employees of those companies. They have also include in that category various other entities controlled by a foreign government. In contrast, where bribes are paid to the government the FCPA bribery provisions do not apply. Thus in the U.N. Oil For Food cases where the bribes and kickbacks were paid to the Iraqi government the books and records provisions were the predicate for the actions by the SEC and, in criminal cases, the wire fraud statutes.

In the Lindsay Manufacturing FCPA case which is currently on trial, Judge Matz in the Central District of California, recently rejected a challenge to a indictment claiming that a state owned enterprise and its employees are not within the statutory definition of foreign official. U.S. v. Noriega, Case No. 2:10-cr-01031 (C.D. Ca.). The pending indictment charges defendants Keith Lindsey, President of privately owned Lindsey Manufacturing, Steve Lee, Vice President and CFO of the company and Lindsey with conspiracy to violate the FCPA as well as substantive violations.

The defendants are alleged to have paid bribes to two high ranking employees of the Comision Federal de Electricidad or CFE, an electric utility company wholly owed by the Mexican government. The payments were made through Grupo International, a company incorporated in Panama and headquartered in Mexico. Employees of that company were also charged but are not on trial. The payments from Lindsay to an employee of Grupo were suppose to be commissions. The government claims that in reality they were bribes paid to Nestor Moreno and Arturo Hernandez, both Mexican citizens and employees of CFE.

The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment claiming that officers and employees of state owned enterprises are not foreign officials within the meaning of the FCPA. The Act defines a foreign official as “any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency or instrumentality thereof . .. “ The question raised by the defense motion is whether a state owned enterprise is an instrumentality of a foreign government.

Under the Mexican Constitution electricity is supplied solely by the government the Court’s opinion notes. Under Mexico’s Public Service Act of Electricity of 1975, the organic law that created CFE, the entity is described as a “decentralized public entity with legal personality and its own partrimony.” On its website CFE is described as a government agency created and owned by the Mexican government.

Defendants claimed however that “as a matter of law no state-owned corporation is an ‘instrumentality,’ meaning that no CFE employee is a ‘foreign official’ under the FCPA.” This argument was based on two key points: 1) the plain meaning of instrumentality and 2) the legislative history of the FCPA.

To support the first proposition defendants cited definitions from three different dictionaries stating that the term focused on “serving as a means or agency.” This concept does not include corporations according to the defense argument. Rather, the word “instrumentality” should be interpreted in view of the preceding words in the definition of foreign official which are “department” and “agency.” While the government agreed that “instrumentality” should be interpreted in view of the earlier words in the statute it disagreed the defense interpretation.

The Court rejected defendants’ contention concluding that: “Defendants’ very language reveals an illogical flaw in their ‘all or nothing’ approach. That is, they argue that a state-owned corporation can never be an ‘instrumentality’ because state-owned corporations ‘do not always’ share the characteristics of departments and agencies. This formulation implicitly concedes that some state-owned corporations can and do share the characteristics of departments and agencies. And defendants never explain why those corporations must be excluded from the definition of ‘instrumentalities.’” Based on this analysis defendants’ motion must fail the court concluded.

Second, the Court considered the legislative history of the Act although in fact it found this exercise unnecessary. Both the defendants and the government claimed that the history of the FCPA supported their position. The Court concluded however that the legislative history is at best equivocal. Accordingly the motion was denied.

In an Addendum the Court expressed astonishment over the position of the government. During briefing and oral arguments on the motion the government referred to CFE as a corporation. After the motion concluded it requested that the Court take judicial notice of the fact that CFE is not in fact a corporation but a “decentralized public entity . . “ a fact it failed to point out to the Court.

Earlier this month the SEC settled an insider trading case which was based on little more than a suspicious trading pattern. In SEC v. Di Nardo (here) the Commission obtained a settlement were the complaint was based on trading in significant option positions in two take over stocks shortly before the announcements. Mr. Di Nardo and his trading vehicle settled by consenting to an injunction and agreeing to pay disgorgement and a penalty equal to about half of the trading profits. The source of the inside information on each deal was not determined.

If Di Nardo, which was based on trading in advance of two deals, was suspicious the trading of Juan Jose Fernandez Garcia in options prior to one deal might be viewed as less suspicious. Nevertheless, it yielded the same result – almost. SEC v. Garcia, Civil Action No. 10C 5268 (N.D. Ill. Filed Aug. 20, 2010).

Mr. Garcia is one of two defendants in the case. The other is Martin Carlo Sanchez. The complaint alleges insider trading in advance of the announcement of the bid by Potash Corporation for BHP Billton Plc. Both men took large positions in the options market shortly prior to the deal announcement. Both traded through Interative Brokers. Both profited following the deal announcement.

The Garcia complaint calls the trading “suspicious.” As in Di Nardo, little more is known about the Garcia defendants than the actual trades placed and profits almost collected. While it is known that Mr. Garcia is the Head of European Equity Derivatives at Banco Santander, S.A. which advised Potash on the bid, there it is no evidence that Mr. Garcia accessed any inside information at the bank. While it is known that both defendants live in Madrid, there is no evidence that Mr. Garcia tipped Mr. Sanchez or even if the men knew each other. Indeed, the complaint admits that its key trader trading claim is based on “information and belief.”

Nevertheless, the Commission settled with Mr. Garcia. He consented to the entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting future violations of Exchange Act Sections 10(b) and 14(e). He also agreed to disgorge his trading profits of $576,033. Unlike Mr. Di Nardo however, Mr. Garcia only agreed to pay a civil penalty of $50,000, which is less than 10% of the trading profits. Apparently suspicious trading in take over stocks may result in an enforcement action as in Di Nardo and Garcia. At the same time less suspicious trading clearly yields a lesser penalty.